Rep. Nadler Lauds Passage of Landmark Women’s Rights Bill Share on Facebook Share on X Print this Page Share by Email Washington, DC, January 27, 2009 Today, Congressman Jerrold Nadler (NY-08), Chair of the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, applauded the passage of S. 181, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009. This bill restores the appropriate limitation period for filing discrimination claims, overturning the Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear. In that decision, Lilly Ledbetter was prevented from being compensated fairly after she had proven that her employer paid her less than her male colleagues for her entire career. This critical bill amends federal civil rights law to ensure that workers may challenge discrimination in compensation for as long as it lasts. Rep. Nadler has been instrumental in this process, holding a hearing in his Subcommittee to consider the need for remedial legislation and helping craft the legislation itself. “I am extremely pleased by today’s triumphant vote for the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, a bill for which I have fought for two years,” said Rep. Nadler. “This legislation ensures that employees can challenge unlawful pay discrimination for as long as it lasts. In 2009, in our great democracy, it is unthinkable that women would be paid less than male counterparts simply because of their sex. We must not tolerate the continuation of the old boys’ network which freely rewards men while excluding women. Today marks a great victory for civil rights in the United States.” The following is Rep. Nadler’s floor statement for the record: “Madame Speaker, I rise in support of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009. “The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 is necessary to overturn the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear. In that decision, this Supreme Court once again went out of its way to read our anti-discrimination laws as narrowly as possible, and refused to interpret the law as intended by Congress. In doing so, the Court said something astonishing: the only discriminatory act was the initial decision to pay Lilly Ledbetter less than her male coworkers. Once the employer had successfully concealed that fact from her for 180 days, she was out of luck, and Goodyear could go on paying her less – just because she is a woman – forever. The 180-day deadline to sue had passed. The decision to discriminate was illegal, but paying her less than her male colleagues from that moment forward was not. “This is astonishing because it rewards employers who successfully conceal pay discrimination and makes it virtually impossible for employees to challenge such discrimination. It is also astonishing because 17 years ago when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress rejected the reasoning that the Supreme Court relied upon in its Ledbetter decision. Through the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress rejected the Supreme Court’s conclusion that a statute of limitations begins to run when an employer adopts a discriminatory seniority system and does not restart when the discriminatory effects of that system are felt. Congress made clear that it was rejecting this reasoning in the context of discriminatory seniority systems, which was the question presented by the Lorance case, and in all other contexts as well. “Until its Ledbetter decision, the Supreme Court seemed to have gotten Congress’s message. In Ledbetter, however, the Supreme Court relied upon the faulty reasoning in Lorance and ruled, once again, that a statute of limitations runs only from the time that a discriminatory decision is made. Now we’re called upon to do it over again. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will hear us once and for all and interpret statute of limitation periods as we intend. Thus, while Ledbetter addresses discrimination in employment, our passage of this bill expresses broad disapproval of the Court’s reasoning in any context where it might be applied. Within the specific context of pay discrimination, our use of the phrase “discriminatory compensation decision or other practice” should be read broadly, and to include any practice – including, for example, seniority or pension practices – that affects overall compensation. “I urge adoption of the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 and yield back the balance of my time.”